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Antitrust Enforcement Regimes: Fundamental Differences

Keith N. Hylton

August 2012

Abstract: Since China has modeled its antitrust regime on that of the EU, there are
essentially two antitrust regime types: the U.S. and the EU. This chapter is a brief
comparative study of the two regimes. I focus on three categories in which fundamental
differences are observed: enforcement, legal standards, and procedure. Within each of
the three categories, I narrow the focus to a specific illustrative feature. With respect to
enforcement, the EU imposes gain-based penalties while the U.S. imposes harm-based
penalties. In predation law, the U.S. has a marginal cost standard and the EU has an
average cost standard. With respect to procedure, the U.S. is a common law system,
while the EU’s procedure is closer to the civil law system in its allocation of power
between the courts and the enforcement agency. These differences have profound
implications for the welfare consequences of global antitrust enforcement.
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There are more than 100 antitrust enforcement regimes around the world (see, e.g.,
Hylton n.d.). Because of this, it is difficult to say much about antitrust statutes globally
without running into the difficulty that such large numbers immediately imply for
comparative projects. Comparisons are possible on a global scale, but they are
necessarily limited to statistical summaries of the major features of the enforcement
regimes.1
In spite of the large number of antitrust enforcement regimes, there are three that are
recognized as extremely important in global commerce: the U.S., the EU, and China.2
Moreover, China has modeled its antitrust law regime on that of the EU (Farmer 2010,
35-36). Given this, there are essentially two antitrust regime types that dominate global
commerce: the U.S. and the EU.
This chapter is a brief comparative study of the two major antitrust regimes. Even
limiting my study to two competition regime types, there are many details in which the
two types diverge. I will not compare the regimes in terms of all of the details. Instead, I
will focus on three major areas in which fundamental differences are observed:
enforcement, legal standards, and procedure.
Within each of the three categories, I narrow the focus to a specific illustrative feature. In
the enforcement category, I discuss penalty provisions. In the legal standards category, I
examine predatory pricing law as a central feature illustrating fundamental differences
between the two regimes. Finally, I summarize broad differences in procedure under the
regimes.
With respect to enforcement, the EU and U.S. regimes differ in that the EU imposes fines
that are based on the violator’s gain while the U.S. imposes harm-based penalties. In
predation law, the U.S. has adopted a marginal cost standard and the EU has adopted an
average cost standard. With respect to procedure, the U.S. is a thoroughly common law
system, while the EU’s procedure is closer to the civil law system in its allocation of
power between the courts and the enforcement agency. These differences have profound
implications for the welfare consequences of global antitrust law enforcement.
Enforcement
The economic theory of enforcement prescribes punishment schemes that maximize
society’s welfare, by reducing the sum of the costs of offensive conduct and the costs of
enforcement. In this part, I briefly review the theory, and use it to address core
differences in the antitrust enforcement policies of the U.S. and the EU.
1

For an empirical study of competition law enforcement regimes around the world, see Hylton and Deng
2007. For comparative analysis, Hylton and Deng group countries into regions (Europe, North America,
etc.) to compare the general stance of antitrust enforcement across regions.
2
The primacy of the U.S., EU, and China antitrust regimes is evidenced by the fact that news stories
discussing major mergers often focus on the approval processes in these three regimes. The coverage of the
Google and Motorola Mobility merger exemplifies this trend (Bartz and Chee 2012; Whitney 2012).
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Optimal Enforcement Policy
The theory of optimal antitrust enforcement is traceable to Gary Becker’s article on the
economics of punishment (Becker 1968). Becker argued that an efficient system of
punishment would seek to internalize the social costs associated with offensive conduct.
Internalization is accomplished by shifting the costs suffered by victims to the offender in
the form of a penalty. Becker considered the implications of his argument for antitrust,
arguing that the social costs arising from antitrust violations should be internalized by
those engaging in anticompetitive conduct (Becker 1968, 198-199). Later, Landes (1983)
provided a more detailed application of Becker’s analysis to antitrust. In the antitrust
context, internalization requires the punishment authority to shift the costs suffered by
consumers, in terms of monopolistic overcharges or restrictions in supply, to the
monopolizing firm in the form of a penalty.
Consider the case of a firm that takes some action that enables it to gain monopoly
pricing power, and at the same time generates efficiencies in production or sale. For
example, the action could be a merger that creates or enhances monopoly power and at
the same generates efficiencies – say, by cutting redundant worksites. Alternatively, the
action could be an exclusive dealing arrangement that forecloses a rival firm and at the
same time reduces costs in the supply chain.
The economic effects of the firm’s conduct can be examined in Figure 1. Before the firm
takes the action, the market is competitive, with price equal to marginal cost (p0 = c0).
After the firm takes the action, it gains the power to raise its price to the monopoly level
p1. However, costs fall, as a result of the firm’s action, from c0 to c1.
The optimal enforcement policy in this case is to impose a penalty on the firm equal to
the sum of the wealth transfer from consumers and the forgone consumer surplus, which
is represented by the sum of areas T and D in Figure 1 (Landes 1983; Hylton and Lin
2010).
Why would setting the penalty equal to the sum of the consumer wealth transfer and the
forgone consumer surplus (T+D) be optimal? The reason is that it aligns the firm’s
incentives with society’s incentives. If the penalty is equal to the sum of the consumer
wealth transfer and the forgone consumer surplus, then the firm will choose to take the
monopolizing action when and only when it enhances society’s wealth.
Suppose the monopolizing action generates an efficiency gain, shown by the area E in
Figure 1. The firm’s action is welfare enhancing for society as long as the efficiency gain
is greater than the forgone consumer surplus, that is, E > D. The firm will choose the
monopolizing action if the gain the firm gets from monopolizing is greater than the
expected penalty for monopolization. The firm’s gain is the sum of the transfer from
consumers and the efficiency gain, T+E. Thus, if the penalty is equal to the sum of the

transfer and the forgone consumer surplus (T+D), the firm will take the monopolizing
action only when it is welfare enhancing (E > D).3
Although I have used the terms “monopolization” and “monopolizing firm”, this analysis
applies equally to cartels. If a cartel has an efficiency basis, then it will lead to an
increase in price, generating a wealth transfer from consumers, and a reduction in supply
costs, generating an efficiency gain. For simplicity, I will use the term “monopolizing
firm” for the remainder of this paper, even in instances in which the monopolizing act is
the decision by a group of firms to create a cartel.
This analysis implies that the optimal antitrust enforcement policy internalizes, to the
monopolizing firm, the harm suffered by consumers. To be sure, this is the optimal
policy because there is an efficiency gain resulting from the firm’s monopolizing action.
If there were no efficiency gain (E = 0), then the optimal policy would set the penalty in
order to completely deter the violator’s conduct (Becker 1968, 180; Hylton 1996, 197198). Such a complete-deterrence penalty would have to be at least as large as the wealth
transfer from consumers (Becker 1968, 198-199; Landes 1983, 656). In other words,
when the firm’s monopolizing action does not generate an efficiency gain, the optimal
punishment policy is complete deterrence, which is accomplished by ensuring that the
firm cannot profit from monopolization.4 Any penalty greater than the wealth transfer (T)
satisfies the complete deterrence – or, equivalently, gain elimination – objective.
Thus, there are two general approaches a punishment authority can take under an optimal
punishment regime. One is to internalize consumer harm. The other is to deter
completely by eliminating the expected profits from anticompetitive conduct. The
internalization approach is appropriate for conduct that is either efficient or has a
significant chance of being efficient. The complete deterrence approach is appropriate
for conduct that is unambiguously inefficient.
I have already provided examples of monopolizing conduct that may be efficient:
mergers and exclusive dealing. As for conduct that is unambiguously inefficient, the
obvious example is the price-fixing agreement (Posner 2001, 39). The standard pricefixing agreement involves no efficiency motivation; it is simply an arrangement to
transfer wealth from consumers to producers (see, e.g., Leslie 1993).5 Under these
conditions, the optimal punishment policy is to set a fine sufficient to eliminate the
prospect of gain from the price-fixing cartel’s actions.
In the case of a price-fixing cartel, the internalization policy still satisfies the optimal
punishment goal, because the consumer harm is the same as the producers’ gain from
3

To see this, note that the firm will take the monopolizing action when T+E > penalty. If the penalty is
equal to T+D, then the firm will monopolize when T+E > T+D, or when E > D.
4
On the distinction between internalization and complete deterrence policies, see Hylton 1998, 425-433
5
It is possible for a price-fixing agreement to be efficient. If the agreement is efficient, and the efficiency
gains are enjoyed by the cartel, the cartel may have an incentive to continue the agreement even when faced
with a damages remedy. See Becker 1968, 199 (“If . . . certain constraints of trade raise the level of
economic welfare, fines could fully compensate society for the harm done, and yet some constraints would
not cease, because the gain to participants would exceed the harm to others.”).

price-fixing. For this reason, Becker concluded that the optimal punishment policy for
antitrust is one that internalizes the consumer harm (Becker 1968, 199).
While it is true that the two policies suggested by enforcement theory, harm
internalization and complete deterrence, can be satisfied in the antitrust setting by a
penalty that internalizes consumer harm, the different policy goals of the internalization
and deterrence approaches should be kept in view. The reason is that there may be
instances in which the internalization approach is administratively infeasible. For
example, the internalization approach requires the punishment authority to produce a
precise estimate of the consumer wealth transfer and the forgone consumer surplus. The
data necessary to generate such an estimate may be unavailable. In such a case, where
the risk of error is substantial, it is important to identify the precise policy basis for
punishment.

p

p1

c0 = p0
c1

Figure 1: Monopolization with Cost Reduction

Actual Punishment Policies
The actual punishment policies of the U.S. and EU systems do not closely follow the
prescriptions of optimal punishment theory. However, their key elements are distinctive
and can be associated with the goals of harm internalization and complete deterrence.
Consider U.S. enforcement policy. The Sherman Act sets out a fixed maximum penalty
of $100 million (Federal Trade Commission n.d., 1). In addition, U.S. law permits courts
to deviate from the fixed maximum penalty in the statute by imposing a penalty equal to
twice the loss imposed by the violator on consumers (18 U.S.C. §3571; Hylton 2003, 49).
In addition, private lawsuits enable plaintiffs to sue for treble damages (see, e.g., Hylton
2003, 48-49). Private lawsuits outnumber government lawsuits by a 10-1 ratio (Salop and
White 1986, 1003).
An optimal consumer harm-based penalty would divide the consumer harm, which is the
sum of the wealth transfer and the forgone consumer surplus, by the probability that the
monopolizing firm will be punished. Thus, going back to Figure 1, the optimal penalty is
equal to T+D, divided by the probability of punishment. The reciprocal of the probability
of punishment is therefore the “optimal multiplier” that should be applied to the
consumer harm penalty.
American law, in contrast, imposes the transfer, T, as a penalty on the monopolizing firm,
and employs either a multiplier of two under the fines enforcement law, or a multiplier of
three for private lawsuits. These multipliers may or may not be optimal, depending on
the relationship between the probability of punishment and the statutory multipliers of
two and three. For example, if the probability of punishment – say because detection is
difficult – is 1/10, then the multipliers on fines and damages would be too low to
efficiently internalize the consumer harm.
Although the statutory multipliers may not be optimal, the American approach is broadly
consistent with the harm internalization approach to punishment. The penalty for an
antitrust violation varies directly with the magnitude of the consumer harm. Thus, the
American antitrust punishment system is one in which violators pay a penalty that is
proportional to consumer harm, where the proportionality factor is greater than one.
Now consider EU antitrust enforcement policy. The EC Treaty provides that the penalty
for an infringement will be based on the total sales of the violator, with a maximum
penalty equal to ten percent of the total revenue of the violator (Kaczorowska 2008, 873).
Article 83(2) of the EC Treaty instructs that penalties should “ensure compliance with the
prohibitions laid down in Article 81(1) and Article 82” (European Community Treaty
2002, art. 83). The relevant treaty provisions have been interpreted by enforcement
officials and commentators to support the deterrence rather than the internalization
objective (Showa Denko v. Commission, para. 58, cited in Wils 2007, 205 n.57; Archer
Daniels Midland v. Commission, para. 49).6
6

EU competition policy’s emphasis on deterrence was also apparent when the EU Commission imposed
double the basic fine against Microsoft in the EU-Microsoft cases (see Economides and Lianos 2010, 372).

The lesson suggested is that the EU penalties are designed to deter prohibited conduct
completely by eliminating the prospect of earning profits through conduct that violates
the antitrust laws. The EU penalties are not designed to vary directly with the amount of
consumer harm; they are structured to vary directly with the amount of profit that a firm
gains from conduct deemed to violate EU competition law.
Thus, the penalty provisions under U.S. and under EU antitrust law reflect the major
economic theories of punishment, complete deterrence and internalization. The EU has
embraced complete deterrence as the objective of enforcement. The U.S. has adopted the
harm internalization approach.
One might be inclined to conclude that the EU has the relatively inefficient enforcement
system. Penalties, such as those under the EU system, that run proportional to revenues
punish efficient as well as inefficient monopolizing conduct with equal severity. The
U.S. system enables firms that intend to engage in efficient monopolizing acts to go
forward and reap the rewards, as long as those rewards are sufficiently greater than the
harm to consumers.
On closer inspection, the comparison, on efficiency grounds, of enforcement provisions
in the U.S. and EU requires consideration of more minute features. First, consider the
distinction between cartelization (anticompetitive agreements among firms, such as
price-fixing) and monopolization (anticompetitive single-firm conduct).
Linking monetary fines to revenues, as the EU system does, may be efficient overall
when applied to cartelization. If the cartels do not have an efficiency basis, as the
enforcement structures in the U.S. and in the EU assume, then the complete deterrence
objective is optimal. It happens that a policy of imposing penalties that are a multiple of
consumer harm will achieve the complete deterrence objective just as effectively as a
policy that aims to eliminate gains. But the policy of complete deterrence, rather than
harm internalization, remains the correct policy on social welfare grounds.
If a cartel does have an efficiency basis, then the EU system would impose inefficiently
large penalties – assessing a penalty based on the sum of the wealth transfer and the
efficiency gain (T+E) instead of limiting the penalty to the wealth transfer (T). However,
both punishment systems are based on the assumption that the vast majority of
cartelization cases are inefficient wealth transfers. If this assumption is correct, then the
EU system’s average degree of inefficiency in cartel punishment cases may be less than
that of the U.S. The reason is that the EU would impose the correct level of the fine in
the vast majority of cases, and an inefficiently large fine in a minority of cases. Under
the same assumptions, the U.S. fine, limited to the transfer, might fall short of providing
optimal deterrence because it fails to fully internalize consumer harm.
To clarify this argument, consider the following hypothetical. Suppose a firm that is
(correctly) found guilty of participating in an inefficient price-fixing conspiracy has a
total annual revenue of $20 billion. Suppose the firm’s gross gain from the conspiracy

(T) is $150 million, and the forgone consumer surplus (D) is $75 million. The penalty
under U.S. law could be as high as $300 million – since the rules permit courts to deviate
from the $100 million Sherman Act limit up to twice the gross gain from the conspiracy.
The penalty under EU law could be as high as $2 billion (10 percent of revenue). If the
likelihood of being punished for the conspiracy is 1/10, the amount necessary to
internalize consumer harm is $2.25 billion, and the amount necessary to eliminate the
prospect of gain is $1.5 billion. The Sherman Act penalty of $300 million would be too
low, from either the internalization or the complete deterrence perspective. The EU rules,
however, could result in an optimal penalty for deterrence purposes. If the EU penalty
were set at a level between $1.5 and $2 billion, it would eliminate the gain prospectively,
which is sufficient to meet the optimal punishment goal in this scenario. If the EU
penalty were set at its maximum of $2 billion, it would come close to internalizing the
consumer harm (the wealth transfer and the foregone consumer surplus).
Moreover, the U.S. enforcement system imposes imprisonment as a punishment on
relevant officials in price-fixing cases, while the EU system limits punishment to the
imposition of monetary fines (Connor 2001, 89). The imprisonment of firm officials may
offset the tendency toward underdeterrence suggested in the numerical example just
offered, but it depends on many factors that are shrouded in uncertainty. Imprisonment
concentrates the risk of punishment on the minority of actors who are responsible for the
price-fixing agreement. If those actors are not aware of the risk of imprisonment, they
will not be deterred. If they are aware of the risk, they are likely to be deterred, but even
this conclusion is uncertain because it depends on the actors’ risk preferences and
psychological attachments. For the relevant actors, the expected cost of imprisonment,
given the low probability, may appear to be small in comparison to the rewards.
In addition, imprisonment generates excessive litigation, as firms and targeted officials
spend huge sums to avoid the punishment. Some of the executives imprisoned have long
productive records as employees in their industries; they are not common criminals.
Society forfeits the value of their services by locking them up.
These points of comparison suggest that the broad-brush, gain-based penalties under the
EU system may be superior on social welfare grounds to the penalty system enacted
under the US antitrust laws for cartelization cases. At the least, it is unclear a priori
whether the U.S. or the EU has the socially preferable system for punishing cartel
activity.
With respect to monopolization, a different assessment seems appropriate. In the
monopolization context, the EU fine system appears to be inferior on welfare grounds to
the U.S. punishment system. The EU system aims to strip the gains from monopolizing
conduct, which deters both efficient as well as inefficient conduct. The U.S. punishment
system, in contrast, discriminates between efficient and inefficient monopolizing conduct.
The discrimination process is not perfectly optimal, but it is probably superior on social
welfare grounds to the EU punishment system.

To clarify this argument, return to Figure 1. Under the U.S. system, the monopolizing
firm would be required to pay a penalty that is likely to be a multiple of the consumer
harm – a multiple of two under public enforcement, and three under private enforcement.
If the efficiency gain from its conduct is sufficiently large, the U.S. punishment system
will not deter a firm from engaging in efficient monopolizing conduct.
For example, suppose, in an particular instance of monopolization, the wealth transfer is
$150 million, the forgone consumer surplus is $75 million, and the efficiency gain is
$200 million. Assume also that the likelihood of being punished is fifty percent – which
reflects the greater likelihood of detection and enforcement in monopolization cases.
Thus, the firm’s gain from monopolization, which is equal to the sum of the wealth
transfer and the efficiency gain, is $350 million. Moreover, since the efficiency gain
exceeds the forgone consumer surplus, this is a case of efficient monopolization. The
penalty imposed under the U.S. system would be either $300 million (twice the transfer)
under public enforcement or $450 million (three times the transfer) under private
enforcement. In either case (public or private enforcement), the monopolizing firm
would not be deterred under the U.S. punishment system. The reason is that the expected
penalty, whether under public or under private enforcement, would be less than the gain
from monopolization: under public enforcement, the expected penalty would be $150
million, which is less than the $350 million gain from monopolization; and under private
enforcement the expected penalty would be $225 million, which is also less than the $350
million gain from monopolization. The monopolizing firm would not be deterred by the
threat of penalization under the U.S. system, and this is the efficient result.
Under the EU system, the monopolizing firm would be required to pay a penalty that is
likely to be a multiple of the sum of the transfer and the efficiency gain (T+E). Thus, in a
case of efficient monopolizing conduct, the firm definitely would lose rather than gain
after taking the penalty into account. For example, suppose a firm with annual revenue
of $20 billion engages in a monopolizing act in some part of its business. The transfer
from consumers is $150 million, the forgone consumer surplus is $75 million, and the
efficiency gain is $200 million. The firm’s total gain from monopolization is therefore
$350 million. As in the previous example, this is a case of efficient monopolization. The
EU could impose a fine on the firm as high as $2 billion.7 If it chooses a fine greater than
$700 million, though still well below the penalty ceiling, it would completely deter the
monopolizing act, an inefficient outcome.
The general picture that emerges from this comparison is that the U.S. antitrust law
enforcement system is compatible with the efficiency goal while EU law is not. EU law
has followed Bentham by setting fines sufficiently large to wipe out the gains from
conduct deemed unlawful. U.S. law has followed Becker by keeping damages closely
tied to the harms suffered by consumers.

7

I have assumed that the firm is large (revenue $20 billion). Obviously, if the firm’s revenue is not much
more than the amount it receives from the monopolizing activity, the EU fine may be far less than the
amount required to deter.

The inefficiency of the EU enforcement system is not limited to the EU. China’s
competition law enforcement system is modeled on the EU’s provisions (Wei 2011, 812815), as are the enforcement rules of several other competition enforcement authorities,
including Pakistan and Singapore (Wilson 2011, 111; Ong 2007, 109-110). The
prevalence of the EU enforcement model indicates a strong preference for enforcement
provisions that threaten fines tied to gain, as a form of trade tariff, rather than fines tied to
consumer harm.
Substantive Standards: Predation
The second important area in which to examine the differences between the major
competition regimes is substantive law. There are many parts of substantive law to
examine. At the most general level, however, the antitrust laws fall into one of two
categories: prohibitions on cartelization, or prohibitions on monopolization. Since the
substantive policies with respect to cartelization are virtually the same in all competition
regimes, I will focus on monopolization law; specifically, predatory pricing.
A predatory pricing claim is an assertion by one firm, the predation target or victim, that
it has been injured by the low prices of another, the incumbent dominant firm. The
victim typically argues that the dominant firm cut its price during a predatory campaign,
in order to force the victim to sustain losses that would compel it to leave the market.
After the victim leaves the market, the dominant firm, if all goes according to the theory,
raises its price to the monopoly level. During the period in which the dominant firm
prices at the monopoly level, it recoups the losses that it suffered during the predatory
pricing campaign.
Predatory pricing claims in the U.S. fall under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The law
under Section 2 puts high hurdles in the way of predation plaintiffs. In order to avoid a
summary judgment in a predation lawsuit, the plaintiff must present evidence that the
defendant set its price below some reasonable proxy for marginal cost, and that the
market structure is such that it would permit the defendant to recoup its losses from the
predation campaign, after the victim has been forced out of the market (Brooke Group
Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 222-224). Both requirements are difficult to
meet.
The EU law on predatory pricing imposes a lighter burden on the plaintiff. Under EU
law, unlawful predation is established if the evidence shows that the defendant sets its
price below average variable cost (see, e.g., AKZO Chemie BV v. Commission, para. 71).
If the defendant set its price below average cost but above average variable cost, then
predation can be established if the evidence suggests that it was accompanied by an
intention to exclude the plaintiff (AKZO Chemie BV v. Commission, para. 72). The
evidence required to prove predatory intent includes objective factors, such as the
duration of the predatory period and the number of units sold at the allegedly predatory
price. The evidentiary requirements suggest that, in practice, a significant burden falls on
the defendant to disprove predatory intent when price is below average cost and above
average variable cost.

The difference between the U.S. and EU standards on price predation reduces to this: the
U.S. uses a marginal cost test and the EU uses an average cost test. Figure 2 illustrates
the fundamental differences between the U.S. and EU with respect to predation. Price
cuts below the marginal cost curve (MC) are predatory in the U.S., provided market
structure evidence shows the plausibility of recoupment (Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 210). In the EU, price cuts below the average cost curve
(AC) are predatory. Since marginal cost is nearly impossible to measure precisely, the
U.S. law encourages courts to examine reasonable proxies to marginal cost (Brooke
Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 223). However, the goal is to use a
measure that approximates marginal cost (United States v. AMR Corp., 1115-1116).

Figure 2: Marginal Cost, Average Cost, and Average Variable Cost

The U.S. marginal cost test, as Areeda and Turner (1975, 701-702) argued, is the efficient
standard. When price is above marginal cost, a cut in price moving it in the direction of
marginal cost, along with an associated increase in consumption, enhances social welfare.
Conversely, when price is below marginal cost, a cut in price moving it away from
marginal cost reduces social welfare. The reason is that price, under ideal conditions,
reflects the marginal benefit to society from producing an extra unit of a good. Marginal
cost, under ideal conditions, reflects the resource cost to society of supplying an
additional unit of a good to the market. As long as price exceeds marginal costs,

society’s welfare can be enhanced by expanding consumption. Hence, a marginal cost
test for predation is consistent with a policy of enhancing society’s welfare.
The average cost test of the EU disregards the efficiency principle and creates a price
umbrella based on the dominant firm’s average total cost. As long as a rival firm can
match the average total cost of the dominant firm, it is shielded from additional price
pressure under the EU law. In addition, given the uncertainties in measuring cost, and the
amount and duration of losses a predatory target firm must experience before it is
financially compelled to leave the market, the EU’s average-cost standard effectively
shields relatively inefficient firms from vigorous price competition.
The precise function or objective of the EU predation standard has never been set out
clearly. One possible justification is that an average cost pricing standard enhances the
set of options to consumers, by preventing efficient price predation. If this is indeed the
purpose of the standard, it is unlikely that it enhances consumer welfare. It preserves
relatively inefficient rivals and forces consumers to pay higher prices. The consumers
themselves probably would have chosen to pay lower prices for fewer retail options, as
they often do when price-cutting firms displace higher-priced rivals.
Another possible justification for the EU average-cost standard is that it preserves
employment, by reducing the frequency with which price competition leads to the exit of
firms that are the victims of predatory pricing campaigns. Less efficient firms are more
likely to survive under the EU standard. Perhaps in a state with a generous welfare
system, the policy of preserving less efficient firms is less expensive for taxpayers than a
policy that allows them to be driven out of business by efficient price predation. In other
words, the average-cost standard may be, in essence, a public welfare policy. The
efficiency of such a policy cannot be determined without taking into account the relative
inefficiencies of the administrative state.
Procedure
The third important difference between U.S and EU antitrust law is procedure. I refer to
procedure in the broadest sense; from the processes by which the legal standards evolve
to the methods used to determine the validity of evidence.
Development of Law
The U.S. is unique among competition law regimes in that its law is developed through
the common law process. The Sherman Act says relatively little (Sherman Act 2004, §§
1 & 2). It can be accurately summarized by saying that it prohibits price-fixing and
monopolization. The detailed rules that have developed in American antitrust law have
almost all come out of the courts.
The EU law has been set out in a relatively sparse treaty. The European Community
Treaty (“EC Treaty”), however, is more detailed in its statement of prohibitions than is
the Sherman Act (European Community Treaty 2002, art. 81). Moreover, the precise

meanings of the key competition provisions of the EC Treaty, Article 81 (now Article
101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”)) and Article 82
(now Article 102 of the TFEU), have been developed for the most part by the European
Commission. For example, the EU Commission has been instrumental in clarifying
“Market Definition” under EU Competition Law, which has ramifications for both
Article 81 and 82 enforcement (see Report Prepared for the Competition DirectorateGeneral of the European Commission 2005, 5). The EU courts defer to the European
Commission on issues concerning the interpretation of the competition rules (Marsden
2009, 27).8 As a result, the system of EU courts is not the primary body that interprets
the meaning of the competition provisions of the EC Treaty.
These differences in the processes under which competition law develops have important
implications. The American process essentially grafts onto the common law an
additional branch called antitrust law without changing the process by which cases are
litigated or decided in any substantial manner. Under the common law process, courts
independently develop a framework for applying legal rules and modifying them in light
of facts or policy arguments.
The common law process permits both sides in litigation, plaintiff and defendant, to
present their positions on the meaning of the law and the state of the evidence to an
impartial observer, the court. The court inevitably has some degree of discretion in both
matters. Cases that are easily decided on the basis of the statutory text, or on the basis of
earlier decisions, do not continue for a long time in court. Judges dismiss them, or decide
them quickly, or the parties settle. The vast majority of legal disputes that spend enough
time in court to come before judges have sufficient uncertainty surrounding them that the
judge inevitably has discretion to decide what the law requires as between the litigating
parties. The discretion that judges have had under the U.S. antitrust laws is equivalent to
the discretion they have had under the common law for centuries.
The discretion given to judges under the American process has permitted courts to
consider the social consequences of their decisions, and to issue judgments that
effectively reduce the social costs of the rules they administer. Common law judges, in
the course of examining the consequences and implications of their decisions, trade off
the social costs of false convictions and false acquittals. Judges do not have to discover
the relevant social costs on their own; the litigating parties have strong incentives to bring
this information directly to the judges’ attention. Most likely because of this constant
process of weighing cost tradeoffs, American antitrust law has tended toward adopting
efficiency-based legal standards, such as the marginal cost based test in predatory pricing
law.
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The European Court of First Instance reviews Commission decisions by a “manifest error of assessment”
standard which considers “whether the facts on which the Commission's assessment was based were
correct, whether the conclusions drawn from those facts were not clearly mistaken or inconsistent and
whether all the relevant factors had been taken into account.” This limited standard of review is deferential
to the Commission.

The dominant role of the enforcement agent imparts a different tendency to the law’s
evolution in EU. The enforcement agent will tend to interpret the law not in a manner
that impartially weighs or trades off social costs from false convictions and false
acquittals, but in a manner that minimizes its own enforcement costs. The dominance of
per se standards based on relatively simple and abstract rules in the EU can be explained
by their utility to the enforcement agent (Evans and Ahlborn 2008, 29).
The importance of administrative facility and the relative detachment of courts from the
law-generation process put the EU system closer to a civil law model rather than the
common law model of the U.S. Given that EU courts are staffed largely with judges
drawn from civil law countries the tendency for a civil law system to develop is natural
(Eurofound 2011; Apple and Deyling 1995, 1).
The EU rule on predatory pricing, for example, is an administratively simple rule. It does
not require the complainant to generate a reasonable proxy of the defendant’s marginal
cost, which is a difficult undertaking, both for the enforcement agent and for the court. It
is not efficient as a rule governing competition. However, it is efficient on administrative
grounds in comparison to the American rule.
Although I have referred to American and EU law, the EU pattern has been replicated in
China and other countries. Thus, one could say that competition law outside of the U.S.
is largely shaped by demands of the enforcement agent. Competition law in the U.S. is
shaped by the traditions of common law courts.
Evidence and Procedure
The deference policy that EU courts have adopted with respect to the EC’s competition
enforcement decisions implies important differences in the assessment of evidence and
findings of fact. In the U.S., antitrust enforcement agencies and private plaintiffs have to
present evidence to a court and attempt to persuade the court that a conspiracy has
occurred, or that a defendant should be deemed a monopolist. In the EU, the
complainants face the same requirements but in the presence of the enforcement agent,
rather than a court. If the enforcement agency has made a decision or is inclined to
pursue a case, all evidence and policy arguments will be examined under the influence of
that decision.
The distinction between the U.S. and EU systems is one between a court-centered process
and an agency-centered process. In a court-centered process, as in the U.S., the plaintiff,
whether a private plaintiff or an enforcement agency, knows that it will have to persuade
a skeptical court of the validity of its arguments, and must prepare its case with this in
mind. Under an agency-centered process, the agency has a relatively small likelihood of
ending up in a court in a particular case. A complainant approaching the enforcement
agency will have to persuade the agency that it has a colorable claim, which is less than
the burden, to prove that a violation of the law has occurred, borne by a private
complainant in a court.

Moreover, there is an important difference between the agency enforcement processes in
the U.S. and in the EU with respect to the degree of separation between prosecutorial and
adjudicative functions. The agency enforcement process in the U.S. is observed in
practice when the FTC brings an enforcement action against an entity. Firms often
approach the FTC with antitrust complaints against market-dominating competitors. If
the FTC chooses to proceed with a complaint, it will either go to a federal court or to an
administrative law judge, depending on the statute it seeks to enforce. While the FTC
must bring enforcement actions for Clayton Act violations in federal court, the FTC may
enforce Section 5 of the FTC Act through internal administrative litigation before an
administrative law judge, a process known as Part III proceedings (Antitrust
Modernization Commission 2007, 129). In either case, the FTC must prepare its
arguments and evidence to withstand questioning by an independent official. Moreover,
the FTC General Counsel’s office is independent of the FTC Commissioners, the final
decision-making body within the agency process (Coate and Kleit 1995, 1-2). There are
substantial walls of separation between the prosecutorial and adjudicative arms of the
FTC’s enforcement process.
The agency process in the EU is distinguishable in the sense that the European
Commission considers complaints and conducts investigations, but there is no separation
between the prosecutorial arm and the adjudicative arm within the EC agency process.
Evidence and arguments are not subjected to an independent assessment until they are
appealed to the EU courts, which have adopted a deference policy with respect to such
matters. And since the EU courts have adopted a deference policy, there really is no
point at which the EC’s evidence and arguments are subjected to a rigorous and
independent evaluation of merit.
The enforcement system in China is based on the EU model. Moreover, the absence of
democracy and of basic “rule of law” norms prevent the court system in China from
becoming reliably independent of the interests of the government.
The upshot is that outside of the U.S., competition law procedure effectively combines
prosecutorial and adjudicative functions. This is a very substantial chasm between the
enforcement regimes. The procedures adopted under the EU model are inconsistent with
fundamental requirements of due process in American law.
The differences in substantive law probably pale in importance when compared to the
differences in procedure. If the EU adopted efficiency-based legal standards, or an
efficiency-based approach to punishment, the potential improvements in welfare could
easily be vacated through the absence of reasonable due process safeguards in the
enforcement process.
Conclusion
With more than 100 competition law regimes, there are countless ways in which antitrust
law regimes can vary around the world. However, two models are dominant in terms of
their effects on global commerce: the U.S. and the EU. This chapter has compared those

models in terms of enforcement, substantive law, and procedure. With respect to
enforcement and substantive law, the U.S. has evolved toward an efficiency-based system
while the EU has not. The procedural differences are perhaps more important than the
differences in substantive law. The EU process of law development is closer to the civil
law model while the American process is safely within the common law tradition. Retaillevel procedural issues, such as the treatment of evidence, reveal stark differences, the
most significant of which being the relatively weak separation of prosecutorial and
judicial functions within the EU enforcement process.
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